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Religious Liberty and Creative Breakthroughs in 
American Politics: Roger Williams and James Madison 
NEAL RIEMER 
Drew University 
What is the relationship between the idea of religious liberty and 
creative breakthroughs in American politics? My thesis is that the idea 
of religious liberty led to the first creative breakthrough in American 
politics in the theory and practice of Roger Williams, and that the idea 
played an important part in the second creative breakthrough in 
American politics in the theory and practice of James Madison; 
moreover, I contend that future breakthroughs in American politics 
will continue to draw fruitfully from concepts, problems, and activities 
in the religious domain. 
What is meant by the concept of "creative breakthrough" and of 
"politics"? A Creative breakthrough in politics refers to a significantly 
fruitful resolution of a major problem in connection with one or more of 
the major interrelated tasks of the discipline of political science. 1 
In connection with the breakthroughs to be examined in this article 
I shall, initially, identify the problem that called for a breakthrough; 
secondly, articulate the theory that addressed itself to the problem; 
thirdly, highlight the breakthroughs in their ethical, empirical, and 
prudential dimensions; and, finally, highlight the central or significant 
role that key religious ideas played in the breakthrough. 
1. Roger Williams and the Breakthrough to Religious 
Liberty 
The troubling problem that faced Williams in seventeenth century 
America had been agitating Western thought and practice since at 
least the advent of Christianity, and it had become more acute with the 
Protestant Reformation: Is it possible to reconcile the dominant ideal 
of religious orthodoxy and political order with the facts of religious 
diversity, religious persecution, and political conflict? The facts of 
religious and political life underscored the realities of disagreement 
{primarily but not exclusively between Catholics and Protestants, and 
also between Protestants and Protestants) on who possessed the one 
true faith. The facts of religious and political life also underscored 
religious and political warfare rooted significantly, if not solely, in such 
religious disagreement. 2 
At the risk of making Williams' position more coherent and 
modern than it was, let me develop his related arguments (1) on behalf 
of religious liberty, and (2) on behalf of separation of church and 
state. 3 
Williams makes a religous and moral argument and an historical 
and expedient argument on behalf of religious liberty. Williams' 
religious and moral argument consists of two main points: first, 
persecution is contrary to the spirit, teaching, and deeds of Jesus; and, 
second, persecution is hypocritical. 
Williams argues that persecution is contrary to the spiritual nature 
of Christ's Gospel and Kingdom. Is it not anomalous, Williams deftly 
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points out, for Christians-in the name of Christ, the Prince of 
Peace-to persecute, to wield the sword, to spill blood, to divide person 
against person? Christ himself indicated that disbelievers must be 
allowed to live in this world, that their punishment would come in the 
next. People should come to God freely, not because of fear of earthly 
persecution, punishment, and coercion. Rape of the soul-Williams' 
vivid image for religious persecution-is incompatible with God's 
message that people be drawn freely to divinity. Enforced uniformity, 
Williams holds, ravishes conscience and violates Christ's message. 
Williams uses a famous New Testament parable-the parable of 
the wheat and the weeds (tares) in Matthew 13-to drive home his 
argument. The weeds (that is, the unregenerate, the impure, the 
faithless) may grow unmolested among the wheat (the elect) until 
harvest time-that is, death. Why? Because the wheat may be en-
dangered by plucking (persecuting) the weeds. At harvest time (Judg-
ment Day) the weeds can safely be gathered and burned; that is, at the 
time of judgment day, punishment can safely be meted out. God's bat-
tles in this world, Williams insists, must be fought with God's 
weapons-God's words-not with swords and prisons, not with 
persecution and civil disabilities. 
A policy of persecution is malicious, vicious, and counter· 
productive; moreover, persecution is hypocritical. Individuals should 
not be forced to believe what their consciences forbid them to believe or 
to support a church (and beliefs) their consciences do not endorse. In 
an imperfect world how can we, Williams asks rhetorically, say we are 
godly and, therefore, have the right to persecute the ungodly who 
adhere conscientiously to their own beliefs? 
In his historical and expedient argument Williams maintains that 
religious persecution undermines civil peace, law, and order, as well as 
results in grave injury to true believers. He notes the alternating 
persecutions of Protestants by Catholics, Catholics by Protestants, and 
Protestants by Protestants. He contends that enforced religious con-
formity destroys the very prerequisites of civilized society, or true 
civility-law, order, peace, respect-as well as injures true believers. 
He also emphasizes that persecution for cause of conscience has not, in 
fact, produced the alleged "good" sought by the persecutors. Religious 
uniformity has not been achieved. "Disbelievers" persist. True 
believers, moreover, are clearly martyred; and civility is clearly 
damaged. On the other hand, Williams argues on the basis of the 
historical record that religious liberty is compatible with the teachings 
of Jesus and with true civility. This point is more fully developed in 
Williams' argument on behalf of separation of church and state. 
Oddly, from a modern point of view, Williams' argument is rooted 
in the conviction that only one church-state (biblical Israel) ever 
possessed the legitimate power to persecute unbelievers. The key 
question for Williams in the seventeenth century thus becomes this: 
What is the proper conception of church and state since Israel and 
Christ? 
The church, Williams argues, is spiritual in nature. It is concerned 
with souls. The weapons for its rightful defense must also be spiritual. 
worldly props, he maintains, would undermine the church. Therefore, 
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a spiritual church can make no use of a secular state for its spiritual 
purposes. God, he writes, has not "appointed the civil sword " as a 
"remedy" for the sores of His Body and His Church. 4 The church must 
be understood as a corporation with an independent existence. Dissent 
and division within the church need not endanger the peace of the 
political community. 
The state is self-sufficient and has peace as its objective. The state 
is different in essence from the church. The state existed before cor-
porations or associations and will remain when they are gone. The 
state does not need the church in order to preserve peace and order. 
The political community does not require enforced religious conformity 
for its continuance . The prince , civil magistrate, or state has limited 
responsibilities: to preserve peace and order in the political community. 
Religious uniformity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for such peace and order. Indeed , when the civil magistrate persecutes 
for cause of conscience, he undermines peace and order. The sword 
and the prison should not, must not, be used to enforce the alleged one 
true religious faith . In brief, matters of religion are to be left to the in-
dividual and to God. The practice of religious faith is not to be a matter 
of concern to the civil magistrate. Religion is to be placed beyond the 
power of the state. 
The most creative breakthroughs are breakthroughs along several 
fronts-ethical , empirical, and prudential-and are well illustrated by 
Williams' religious and political philosophy. Ethically, Williams ar-
ticulates an admirable philosophy of politics, of how we ought to live 
together. He affirms a philosophy of people of different religious faiths 
living together-freely, happily, harmoniously, civilly, orderly, 
peacefully, prosperously-in the same political community. For 
Williams, in practice, this community is to be a democratic political 
community . Religious freedom , the separation of church and state, a 
democratic and constitutional polity-these are for Williams preferred 
and crucial values . They become more strongly established in political 
American practice in the late eighteenth century (with help from 
philosopher-statesmen such as James Madison) and provide the basis of 
expanded notions of basic rights and republican rule, and thus serve to 
ensure a more generous democratic and constitutional regime. 
Empirically, Williams articulates a new hypothesis, which would 
be a cornerstone for his "lively experiment" in what is later to be called 
Rhode Island, and which will (as already noted above) be subsequently 
tested more fully in the United States. The new hypothesis was this: 
that in the United States people of different religious faiths-enjoying 
religious liberty-can in fact live together without the evil effects that 
some feared (incivility, immorality, disrespect for law and order, war); 
that in fact religious persecution is the great enemy of society, of har-
mony, of peace, and of prosperity. 
Prudentially, Williams makes the judgment that it is wise to ensure 
religious liberty and to separate church and state. He does so by calling 
attention to the ill-effects, hypocrisy, and illogic of persecution; by act-
ing to limit the abusive power of state in religious matters; and by 
establishing legitimate domains of operation for church and state. 
Williams, an orthodox Puritan in essentials, does not deny that 
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there is only one true faith; but he does emphatically reject the proposi-
tion that it is the duty of the ruler of the state to maintain the one true 
faith. And he clearly rejects the conventional wisdom at key points. 
Those adhering to the conventional wisdom could only believe that 
Williams' ethical recommendation on behalf of religious liberty is 
outrageous; that his empirical proposition that religious liberty and 
political peace are compatible is false; and that his prudential judgment 
that religious liberty and separation of church and state are wise is ab-
surd. However, when the decision on behalf of religious liberty is 
tested, it works. In time religious liberty becomes enshrined in the 
First Amendment as a cardinal and admired value . Religious liberty 
serves in fact to advance social harmony. Both religious liberty and 
separation of church and state function to protect against the abuse of 
religious and political power. The way to democratic and constitutional 
pluralism is open. 
Let me now turn to James Madison and note how he articulates in 
his theory of the extensive republic the second great breakthrough in 
American politics. This breakthrough, I will argue, owes a great debt 
to Madison's fundamental commitment to religious liberty and separa-
tion of church and state, and to his cardinal insight about the link be-
tween a multiplicity of religious sects and freedom. 
2. James Madison and the Breakthrough to the "Extensive 
Republic" 
The problem facing Madison and thoughtful Americans in 1787 
was this: Is just republican government in a large state possible? 
Republican thinkers in America were struggling to avoid being impaled 
on either horn of a dilemma: either a despotic empire as a necessity of 
government in a large state; or faction, injustice, and weakness as the 
inevitable outcome in a confederate republic with major power residing 
in the thirteen American states! 
The problem was not only theoretical but practical. Patrick Henry 
and other anti-federalists-arguing that republican government is 
possible only in a small political community-opposed the new con-
stitution of 1787 and the stronger government it created. They could 
not lift their sights beyond the loose political confederation of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation. Alexander Hamilton and John Adams and 
other advocates of "high toned" government maintained-before the 
adoption of the new constitution-that only an Empire, or a strong cen-
tral government on the British model, could hold together a political 
community as large as the new American nation. Confederations, they 
insisted, were notoriously weak and unstable, plagued by faction, and 
detrimental to the interests of justice and the common good. Madison's 
great contribution was to demonstrate that the conventional 
wisdom-the testimony of history and previous political theory-was 
wrong. 5 
Madison believed that a strengthened federal republic would 
enable the nation to cope with matters of national concern and yet 
would leave ample powers-and freedom-to the people in the several 
states. The new federalism would thus affirm: a unique division of 
powers between nation and states; key constitutional prohibitions on 
both the nation and the states; the direct operation of federal law on the 
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individuals of the nation; a pragmatic and experimental federal system 
relying for its success upon a national consensus, a representative 
system, separation of powers, a resourceful presidency, and such 
organs as the Supreme Court. Madison argued decisively (and here we 
come to the heart of his empirical theory of the extensive republic) that 
the multiplicity, diversity, and conflict of factional interests, plus their 
larger sphere of operations, would diminish the possibility of factional 
agreement and unified factional action. Federalism would limit the 
spread of factional mischief, and make it difficult for a factional majority 
to achieve power. What we today call pluralism would facilitate, not 
hinder, the pursuit of the common good. Madison sought in 1787, then 
in 1789, in the 1790s, and finally in the 1820s and early 1830s, to make 
his theory relevant to the central challenge of reconciling liberty and 
large size. His approach called for a keen analysis of the danger facing 
republican government, political debate, popular or party protest, and 
a willingness to use radical constitutional means to secure necessary 
change. 
Madison's devotion to religious liberty strengthened both his devo-
tion to constitutionalism and to federalism . This devotion enabled him 
to see that the same principle-of the salutary consequences of the 
multiplicity of sects-that operated to ensure religious liberty might 
also operate (now as the multiplicity of political, economic, and social 
interests) to ensure civil freedom . Human wit could, indeed, perceive 
that pluralistic diversity might advance freedom without interfering 
with civil decorum and harmony. As early as 1785 Madison had 
recognized that only a coalition between religious sects could endanger 
our religious rights. 6 Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessments (1785) testifies to his early great defense of 
religious liberty. His success in defeating such assessments was in no 
small measure to be attributed to the reality of the beginnings of 
religious pluralism in his native Virginia. In 1787 Madison again ex-
pressed his worry about a religious sect forming a majority and using 
its power to oppress other sects. And he noted that civil as well as 
religious rights could be endangered by an oppressive majority . To 
Madison the multiplicity of religious sects guarded against such op-
pression. In the Virginia Ratifying Convention of 1788 Madison drove 
home his point clearly and vigorously. "If there were a majority of one 
sect, a bill of rights would be poor protection for liberty. Happily for 
the states, they enjoy the utmost freedom of religion. This freedom 
arises from that multiplicity of sects, which pervades America, and 
which is the best and and only security for religious liberty in any society. 
For where there is such a variety of sects, there cannot be a majority 
of any one sect to oppress and persecute the rest. 7 This idea, I am argu-
ing, was in Madison's mind before, during, and after the writing of the 
Constitution. So, too, I am suggesting, was the link between religious 
plurality and freedom, on one hand, and economic, political, and social 
plurality and freedom on the other. It was an easy step from the value 
of religious plurality for freedom to one of Madison's cardinal ideas-
an idea central to his creative breakthrough in 1787-that the 
multiplicity and diversity of political, economic, and social interests 
would similarly constitute a safeguard for political freedom. 
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Thus Madison's religious convictions carried over into the political 
arena. Again, the concern for religious freedom would strike another 
great blow for democratic and consitutional government in American 
politics. 
3. Conclusion 
It is I believe no accident that key religious ideas-particularly the 
ideas of religious liberty, separation of church and state, religious 
pluralism-have played such a prominent part in creative 
breakthroughs in American politics. Moreover, if we look to other 
reform movements in American history and politics-anti-slavery, 
women 's suffrage, peace, economic reform, anti-discrimination-we 
can detect a comparably prominent religious role. Similarly, as we con-
template current and future problems we may well conclude that key 
religious ideas will play a prominent part in our efforts to deal with 
them. This, I would suggest, is bound to be the case because of the in-
timate connection between key religious ideas and a more prophetic 
politics. In taking key religious ideas seriously-belief in the Divine, in 
freedom of conscience, in covenant, in commandments-people in 
politics take seriously the gap between religious values and existential 
reality. They are, moreover, sensitized to probe both the reasons for 
such gaps and what might be done to bridge them. Genuinely creative 
breakthroughs in politics are rare, but the two examples treated in this 
essay (and the links between religious ideas and other reform 
movements hinted at above) suggest that religious liberty and other 
key religious ideas will play a significant role in future breakthroughs 
in American politics. 
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